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Abstract
From 1961 to 2007, U.S. aggregate hours worked increased and the labor wedge measured
as the discrepancy between a representative households marginal rate of substitution and
the marginal product of labor declined substantially. The labor wedge is negatively related
to hours and is often attributed to labor income taxes. However, U.S. labor income taxes
increased since 1961. We examine a model with gender and marital status heterogeneity
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1 Introduction
From 1961 to 2007, U.S. average hours worked dened as total market hours per working-
age person increased by 13 percent. Concurrently, the U.S. labor wedge, measured as
the discrepancy between a representative households marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure (MRS) and the marginal product of labor (MPL), declined by 37
percent. Somewhat surprisingly, despite being much larger than the frequently studied short-
run uctuations, the long-run change in the U.S. labor wedge has received little attention in
the literature.1 Such long-run trends are negatively related to changes in hours and are often
attributed to variations in taxes (e.g., Mulligan (2002)) because the labor wedge denoted
here by  resembles a labor income tax (i.e., by denition 1     MRS
MPL
). However,
U.S. labor income taxes increased since 1961. As a result, standard representative agent
models (e.g., Prescott (2004), Ohanian, Ra¤o, and Rogerson (2008)) deliver counterfactual
predictions for the U.S., as higher taxes imply lower hours and a higher labor wedge.
In this paper, we show that incorporating gender and marital status heterogeneity in an
otherwise standard growth model is quantitatively important in accounting for the observed
trends in U.S. hours and the labor wedge. Our focus on household heterogeneity is motivated
by the large changes in hours and wage rates by gender and marital status since 1961.
Married womens hours more than doubled and mens hours declined, while gender wage
gaps decreased substantially. In our model, shrinking gender wage gaps contribute to an
increase in aggregate and womens hours and deliver a decline in the measured labor wedge,
in spite of higher taxes. A key takeaway is that large changes in cross-sectional heterogeneity
over time are reected in long-run changes in the measured labor wedge.
The intuition for why cross-sectional heterogeneity in wages and hours impacts the mea-
sured labor wedge is straightforward. In a representative agent model, the labor wedge is
1Given a high labor supply elasticity (typically used in macro studies), Shimer (2010) documents a decline
in the U.S. labor wedge from 1959 to 2007 of about 35 percent, consistent with our calculations (see Figure
1.1 in his book). The U.S. labor wedge decline is about 1:5 times larger for a low labor supply elasticity. In
addition, Shimer reports that business cycle uctuations of the U.S. labor wedge have a standard deviation
between 1:8 and 5:5 percent, the larger number corresponding to a low labor supply elasticity.
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measured from the intratemporal equilibrium condition which relates theMRS to theMPL
using aggregate data which averages out cross-sectional heterogeneity. In a heterogenous
agent model, the labor wedge is derived from a weighted aggregate of the householdsin-
tratemporal equilibrium conditions. These equations are nonlinear relationships between
consumption, hours and wages, and, thus, cross-sectional di¤erences in hours and wages do
not average out. We formalize this idea in a simple static model where households di¤er
in their labor productivity. We show that, the larger are di¤erences in productivity and
hours across households, the larger is the discrepancy between the aggregate MRS and the
aggregate MPL, i.e. the labor wedge. It follows that changes in cross-sectional di¤erences
in productivity and hours map into changes in the measured labor wedge.
To quantify the contribution of this mechanism to long-run changes in U.S. hours and
the labor wedge, we examine a standard model augmented with three types of households:
married couples, single women and single men.2 In our model, women receive a lower hourly
wage rate compared to men, due to lower productivity and discrimination (as suggested by
Goldin (1992)), and the labor income of all households is taxed. We evaluate the impact of
taxes and cross-sectional wage heterogeneity on the documented trends in U.S. data. Higher
taxes deliver counterfactual predictions for U.S. hours and the labor wedge. However, reduc-
tions in gender wage gaps for married couples and singles (reecting lower discrimination,
or higher relative productivity of women, or a combination of the two) generate a long-run
increase in aggregate and womens hours and a long-run decline in the aggregate labor wedge.
A calibrated version of our baseline model with gender wage gaps and taxes measured
fromU.S. data accounts for 63 percent of the increase in average hours worked, 86 percent of
the increase in married womens hours and about 30 percent of the decline in the labor wedge.
To isolate the contribution of gender wage gaps, we consider a variation of our baseline model
with constant taxes. This experiment accounts for virtually all of the increase in aggregate
and womens hours and about 54 percent the decline in the labor wedge. The model does
2It is possible to extend the model to allow for other types of heterogeneity, e.g. di¤erences in skill levels
implied by the rise in the education premium. Such extensions are beyond the scope of this paper.
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not account for all of the decline in the labor wedge, since it has di¢ culty capturing the
observed increase in the U.S. consumption to output ratio since the mid 1980s.
We consider two extensions of our analysis which have been suggested as possible ex-
planations for the long-run increase in U.S. hours, and evaluate their impact on the labor
wedge. Following Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos (2008), we incorporate child care
costs in our model. We nd that reductions in this cost lead to additional increases in
married womens hours and in aggregate hours, but contribute only a further 6 percentage
points to the decline in the labor wedge. Second, we examine whether changes in leisure
time which reect non-market hours (e.g. time spent in home production) can improve pre-
dictions for the U.S. labor wedge, as suggested by Ohanian, Ra¤o, and Rogerson (2008).
Our back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the increase in U.S. leisure time since
mid-1960s which varies from 2 percent in Ramey and Francis (2009) to a range of 5:4 to
15 percent in Aguiar and Hurst (2007) can account for 6:5 to 50 percent of the decline in
the U.S. labor wedge. We view both extensions as complementary to our analysis.
A natural question is whether the mechanism we analyzed in detail for the U.S. is quanti-
tatively important in other economies. We extend our analysis of long-run changes in hours
and labor wedges to Canada and Germany. In Canada, similar to the U.S., the closing of
the gender wage gaps and increases in female hours dominate the increase in taxes and lead
to a decline in the labor wedge over the last four decades. Germany is especially interest-
ing, since taxes increased by more than the increase in the labor wedge over the last two
decades. Reductions in cross-sectional heterogeneity in Germany (captured by a shrinking
gender wage gap for married couples and higher married womens hours) are important as
they partly undo the e¤ect of higher taxes, bringing the models labor wedge closer to that
measured from aggregate data. The improved predictions for the labor wedges lead us to
conclude that heterogeneity also helps account for changes in hours in Canada and Germany.
Lack of long-run micro survey data prevents us from extending this analysis to a larger
number of countries. However, our mechanism is broadly consistent with aggregate data on
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hours worked, tax rates and measured labor wedges for a number of other OECD economies
where gender wage gaps shrunk. In economies with large changes in hours and the labor
wedge, cross-sectional heterogeneity can be quantitatively important in reversing the e¤ects
of higher taxes (as observed in Spain, Italy and Belgium), or in accounting for reductions
in labor wedges which are larger than reductions in tax rates (as observed in Netherlands,
Finland and the U.K.).
The labor wedge is a reduced-form diagnostic tool used extensively in the literature to
identify types of distortions that improve a models predictions for hours and other aggregate
data (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007)).3 Much of this literature has focused on ac-
counting for the measured labor wedge via distortions such as taxes, monopoly power, sticky
wages or search frictions (e.g., Mulligan (2002), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), Shimer
(2009)). Our paper contributes to this literature by highlighting that long-run changes in
the measured labor wedge can occur due to non-distortionary cross-sectional di¤erences in
householdslabor supplies and productivities.4
The idea that aggregation across heterogenous households may lead to a labor wedge
was pointed out by Maliar and Maliar (2003) and Chang and Kim (2014) in the context
of business cycle models. Similar to Maliar and Maliar (2003), we analytically relate cross-
sectional household heterogeneity to our models labor wedge, while Chang and Kim (2014)
illustrate such a relationship in a quantitative exercise.5 Our contributions relative to these
works are twofold. First, we quantify the role of household heterogeneity in accounting for
the long-run decline in the U.S. labor wedge, despite the observed increase in U.S. labor
3Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) show that distortions that manifest themselves as labor wedges are
important in understanding the U.S. Great Depression and the 1982 recession. Other studies also show the
labor wedge is important in generating predictions in line with macroeconomic aggregates in many countries
(e.g., Brinca (2014) and citations therein).
4Other papers attribute the labor wedge to shifts in preferences (e.g., Parkin (1988) and Hall (1997)),
or rm level nancial frictions (e.g., Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2012) and Jermann and Quadrini
(2012)). Karabarbounis (2014a) also examines the contribution of non-distortionary factors namely home
production to changes in the labor wedge is an international business cycle model.
5In Maliar and Maliar (2003), the representative consumers intratemporal condition can be written as
MRS
MPL =
1
t
, where t is a composite of individual agentscharacteristics from the equivalent heterogenous
agent economy. Maliar and Maliar (2003) refer to t as a labor shock from aggregation. In the language of
our paper, 1  1t represents the labor wedge.
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income taxes. Second, we use our models analytical relationship between heterogeneity and
the labor wedge to extend the analysis to other countries.
Our paper falls into the class of household-based explanations of long-run changes in the
labor wedge. Our focus on developing the household side of the standard model is consistent
with Karabarbounis (2014b), who shows that uctuations in the labor wedge for the U.S.
and other OECD economies are mostly accounted for by discrepancies between the MRS
and the real wage, rather than discrepancies between the MPL and the real wage. Our
contribution is to show that discrepancies between the aggregate MRS and the wage rate
are also important in a long-run analysis of the labor wedge.
Our paper also relates to the work on taxation and long-run changes in hours. Prescott
(2004) and Ohanian, Ra¤o, and Rogerson (2008) nd that taxes account for most of the
variations in hours over time and across countries, but identify the U.S. experience as an
exception, as both taxes and hours increased since the 1960s.6 Our paper shows that incor-
porating female labor supply and shrinking gender wage gaps allows an otherwise standard
growth model to capture most of the observed increase in U.S. hours, despite higher taxes.
Moreover, our results connect the labor wedge to the literature analyzing gender wage gaps
and womens hours (e.g., Goldin (1992), Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003), Bar and
Leukhina (2011) and Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos (2008)).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the U.S. trends in hours and
the labor wedge and presents a simple model to illustrate that household heterogeneity can
be important in understanding these trends. Section 3 presents our model with gender and
marital status heterogeneity and the analytical derivation of the models labor wedge. Section
4 presents the quantitative experiments and results. In Section 5; we discuss the importance
of changes in child care costs and leisure time for U.S. hours and the labor wedge. Section
6 extends our analysis to other OECD economies. We conclude in Section 7.
6Scandinavian countries are also exceptions, see Ragan (2006) and Rogerson (2007). Other countries
where taxes and hours increased over time are discussed in Section 6.
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2 U.S. Data and a Simple Static Model
In this section, we rst document the trends in U.S. hours and the labor wedge. Then, we
develop a simple model to illustrate that household heterogeneity in productivity and labor
supply can help in understanding these trends.
2.1 Long-Run Changes in U.S. Hours and the Labor Wedge
Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, the U.S. working-age population worked, on average, 25
hours per week (Figure 1). Since the early 1980s, aggregate hours worked increased steadily
to 28 hours per week in 2007. This increase in aggregate hours is driven by women. Married
womens average hours more than doubled from 10 hours a week in 1961 to 23 hours a week
in 2007: Single womens average hours increased slightly, while mens hours declined over the
47 year period (Appendix A:1 provides details on the data sources and computations).7
The increase in U.S. aggregate hours from 1961 to 2007 was accompanied by a decline
in the U.S. labor wedge (Figure 1). As is standard in the literature, we measure the labor
wedge using U.S. aggregate data and the intratemporal labor equilibrium condition from the
neoclassical growth model with a representative household (e.g., Parkin (1988), Hall (1997),
Mulligan (2002), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) and Shimer (2009)). Specically,
in this model, the intratemporal condition equates the marginal product of labor (MPL)
to the representative households marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure (MRS). As this relationship does not hold in the data, the aforementioned literature
dened the labor wedge at time t denoted here by t as the discrepancy between the
MRS and the MPL: Namely, 1 t MRSt=MPLt:
Many macroeconomic studies (including, but not limited to, the ones cited above) assume
a Cobb-Douglas production function. The MPL can then be written as (1  ) yt=lt; where
yt denotes output per person, lt denotes aggregate hours worked per person and 1   is the
7U.S. aggregate hours worked have declined during the most recent recession, dated by the NBER to
last from December 2007 to June 2009. The changes in hours observed since 2007 are interesting in their
own right, but are not analyzed in this paper.
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labor income share. Time separable log preferences in consumption and leisure frequently
used in macroeconomic studies give aMRS equal to  (ct + gt) = (1  lt) ; where ct denotes
private consumption per person, gt denotes public consumption per person,  is the leisure
utility parameter and  measures the marginal rate of substitution between government and
private consumption. With these functional forms, the labor wedge, t; is dened as in (1).
1 t 

 (ct + gt)
1  lt

=

(1  ) yt
lt

=

1   
(ct + gt)
yt
 11
lt
  1 (1)
To measure t, we use U.S. data on ct; gt; yt; lt and parameters  = 0:33,  = 1:6 and
 = 1 (as in Prescott (2004) and Ohanian, Ra¤o, and Rogerson (2008)). As visible in
Figure 1; the U.S. measured labor wedge is fairly constant for the period 1961 to 1980; and
declines between the early 1980s and 2007: This substantial decline in the labor wedge is
also documented by Mulligan (2002) and Shimer (2010), under di¤erent functional forms for
the marginal value of time (MRS).
The labor wedge is used extensively in the literature as a diagnostic tool to help identify
types of distortions that improve a models predictions for hours worked. Typically, the
labor wedge is thought of as measuring labor market distortions. With this interpretation,
the increase in U.S. aggregate hours since 1961 could be attributed to a decline in labor
market distortions. However, one candidate of such distortions, the e¤ective labor income
tax dened as a combination of consumption and labor income taxes, as in Prescott (2004)
and Shimer (2009) rose over the last ve decades (Figure 1). The focus of our paper is to
show that changes in the labor wedge are not entirely driven by labor market distortions,
such as taxes, but also reect changes in non-distortionary factors, such as the labor supplies
and relative productivities of various subgroups of the population.
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2.2 Heterogeneity and the Labor Wedge
We present a simple static model with heterogenous households to build intuition for the
idea that cross-sectional di¤erences in productivity and labor supply can be quantitatively
important for understanding the long-run decline in the U.S. labor wedge.
The economy consists of J types of households. Each household j has one member who
is endowed with one unit of time and has a xed amount of capital given by kj. Households
supply labor in the market, but di¤er in their productivity, which is denoted by zj: The
maximization problem solved by household j is:
max
cj ;lj
log (cj + g) +  log (1  lj)
subject to: cj  rkj + (1   l)wzjlj +  j
where cj denotes private consumption, g denotes government consumption per person, lj
is the fraction of available time devoted to work and 1   lj is leisure time. As before, 
is the leisure utility parameter and  measures the marginal rate of substitution between
government and private consumption. Households receive a wage w per unit of e¤ective
labor, zjlj; and capital income rkj for renting the capital stock to the rm. We include
capital in the static model to be analogous to our model in Section 3. Labor income is taxed
at rate  l; and  j are lump-sum transfers from the government.
The representative rm uses capital, K =
P
j kj; and e¤ective labor, ~L =
P
j (zjljNj)
where Nj is the number of households of type j; to produce output according to the Cobb-
Douglas production function: Y = AK ~L1 . Here, A denotes the total factor productivity
and  is the capital income share. The wage rate per unit of e¤ective labor is given by
w = (1  ) y=~l; where y = Y=N is the output per person, N = Pj Nj is the total population
and ~l = ~L=N is the aggregate e¤ective labor per person.
In this simple model, it is straightforward to show that there exists a wedge between the
aggregate marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure (MRS) and the
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marginal product of an hour worked (MPL). To derive the expression for the labor wedge, we
aggregate the optimality conditions which equate household js marginal rate of substitution
to its after-tax marginal product of labor, i.e.  (cj + g) = (1  lj) = (1   l)wzj for each
j. These equations are nonlinear relationships between consumption, hours and wages. As
a result, cross-sectional di¤erences between households do not average out, and are mapped
into the labor wedge. Aggregation across households yields equation (2).8
 (c+ g)
1  l = (1   l)
 X
j
zj
1  lj
1  l
Nj
N
!
l
~l
 (1  ) y
l
(2)
where c  Pj cjNj=N is aggregate private consumption per person, l  Pj (ljNj) =N is
aggregate hours worked per person, and where we have used the expression for the wage w:
The labor wedge, ; dened as in equation (1), can then be written as in (3).
1  

 (c+ g)
1  l

=

(1  ) y
l

= (1   l)
 X
j
zj
1  lj
1  l
Nj
N
!
l
~l
(3)
The labor wedge in this simple model is partly due to distortionary taxes, but also reects
non-distortionary factors such as di¤erences in householdsproductivities and labor supply
decisions. Both of these dimensions of heterogeneity are needed to generate the labor wedge
in equation (3). In particular, if households have the same productivity, i.e. zj = z for all
j, or if households work the same number of hours, i.e. lj = l for all j, the labor wedge in
equation (3) reduces to 1   l, the expression encountered in the neoclassical growth model
with a representative household and labor income taxes.9
To gain further insights from equation (3), we consider a numerical example which illus-
trates that as di¤erences in householdsproductivities and hours worked shrink, so does the
8We multiply the individual optimality conditions by the fraction of agents of type j in the total popula-
tion, Nj=N; and sum up to get: 
P
j (cj + g)Nj=N = (1   l)
P
j zj (1  lj) (Nj=N)w: Next, we substitute
in the expression for the wage and divide both sides by (1  l).
9If zj = z for all j; then ~l = z 
P
j ljNj
N = zl and 1  = (1   l)
P
j
1 lj
1 l
Nj
N

= 1   l: If lj = l for all
j, then ~l = l Pj (zjNj) =N and 1  = (1   l)Pj zj NjN  l~l = 1   l:
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labor wedge. Consider an economy with two types of households of equal mass, Nj=N = 0:5
for j 2 f1; 2g, and no tax distortions,  l = 0. Lets examine di¤erent scenarios for the
householdslabor supplies, lj; and productivities, zj. First, assume type 2 households are 30
percent less productive and work only a quarter of the time per week compared to type 1
households. Let z1 = 1:00; z2 = 0:70; l1 = 0:40 and l2 = 0:10. These di¤erences generate
a wedge between the aggregate MRS and the MPL computed from equation (3) equal
to  = 0:128. Smaller di¤erences in both hours and productivity (z1 = 1:00; z2 = 0:85;
l1 = 0:40 and l2 = 0:30) reduce the labor wedge to about  = 0:02. This simple illustration
shows that reductions in cross-sectional heterogeneity can result in a substantial decline in
the labor wedge. This nding motivates our model in Section 3, where cross-sectional di¤er-
ences between households are reected in gender wage gaps and hours di¤erences. Section 4
shows that shrinking gender wage gaps and the ensuing increase in womens hours are quan-
titatively important for understanding the long-run decline in the U.S. labor wedge. Section
6 provides international support for this mechanism using data for other OECD economies.
3 General Model
To quantify the importance of our mechanism to the long-run trends in U.S. data, we consider
a neoclassical growth model with three types of households: married couples, single females,
and single males. The labor supply decisions of individuals are inuenced by several factors,
of which the most important are gender wage gaps and e¤ective labor income taxes.
Let Nt be the total population at time t. Let Npt; Nfst; and Nmst be the total number
of married couples, single females and single males, respectively. Males and females in our
model di¤er for two reasons. First, married and single females receive a lower wage than
males, consistent with the data. Second, individuals in a married couple have di¤erent utility
weights. In quantitative experiments, reductions in gender wage gaps generate an increase
in female hours worked over time, while the utility weights pin down the relative level of
11
hours for married men and women in the rst period of our model (as detailed in Section 4).
As in Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003), we assume married couples choose streams
of consumption, labor supply and investment to solve their joint decision problem with utility
weights given by f and m.
max
1X
t=0
t [fUf (cfpt + gt; 1  lfpt) + mUm (cmpt + gt; 1  lmpt)]Npt
subject to :
cfpt + cmpt + xpt  [(1   kt) rt +  kt] kpt + (1   lt)wt [lmpt + (1   pt) lfpt] +  pt
Npt+1
Npt
kpt+1  xpt + (1  ) kpt
Here, subscripts f and m denote female and male, subscript p indicates a married couple
or partnership, and t is the time subscript. The utility of a married individual of gender j 2
ff;mg is dened over streams of private consumption, cjpt; average government consumption,
gt; and leisure time, 1   ljpt; where available time is normalized to 1 and ljpt is the labor
supply expressed as the fraction of available time worked. The discount factor is  2 (0; 1) :
The parameter  2 (0; 1) measures the marginal rate of substitution between private and
government consumption. The married couple owns capital stock, kpt; which depreciates
at rate  and is augmented by investments, xpt: The capital stock is rented to the rm at
interest rate rt; and capital income net of depreciation is taxed at rate  kt: The married
couple pays taxes on labor income at rate  lt and receives lump-sum transfers,  pt.
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In our model, married males receive an hourly wage rate of wt; while married females
receive only wt (1   pt) per hour worked. Here,  pt 2 (0; 1) represents the exogenous gender
wage gap for married couples.11 We assume that productivity di¤erences account for fraction
10In our model, the e¤ective labor income tax (dened in Section 4:1) is the same for singles and married
individuals, as well as for men and women. We have constructed estimates of average income taxes for single
men, single women, married men and married women using the methodology in Kryvtsov and Ueberfeldt
(2007). We nd that while the level of the tax varies slightly, the increase in the income tax between 1961
and 2001 is comparable across groups. Moreover, Bar and Leukhina (2009) nd that the U.S. tax reforms of
1980s have a small e¤ect on married females participation. For these reasons, we do not consider di¤erent
tax rates for the di¤erent households in our model.
11A few studies in the literature endogenize the gender wage gap. Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2002,
12
 2 [0; 1] of the gender wage gap, while discrimination accounts for the remainder. In
particular, the hourly wage rate received by a married woman can be written as:
wt (1   pt) = wt (1   pt)  wt (1  )  pt (4)
where wt (1   pt) is the wage rate women should receive given their marginal product
of labor (i.e. taking into account productivity di¤erences relative to men), while the term
wt (1  )  pt represents the portion of the wage rate lost due to discrimination. Our as-
sumption is motivated by Goldin (1992), who shows that some of the U.S. gender gap in
earnings for various occupations can be explained by di¤erences in observable attributes
between men and women, such as job experience, education. However, a substantial part of
the earnings gap remains unexplained and is attributed to discrimination.12
Measures of wage discrimination from U.S. data such as those discussed in Goldin
vary over time. For simplicity, we consider that the fraction of the gender gap accounted
for by discrimination is constant over time in the model and is given by 1   . In Section
4; we evaluate the importance of this assumption for female hours and the U.S. labor wedge
by presenting results under two extreme scenarios: the gender wage gap is due entirely to
discrimination or due entirely to productivity di¤erences.
For  2 (0; 1), our model is consistent with the view that reductions in the gender
gap observed in the U.S. since the early 1960s; were a consequence of improvements in
productivity of women and reductions in discrimination. As seen in equation (4), when the
gender wage gap,  pt; shrinks over time, the marginal product of a married womans labor,
wt (1   pt), increases, while the wages lost due to discrimination, wt (1  )  pt; decline.
2005) endogenize the married womens gender wage gap, by relating it to the human capital lost after child
birth. In Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) the gender wage gap is partly endogenous, due to human
capital decisions, and partly exogenous, due to direct wage discrimination or to the existence of a glass
ceilingthat keeps women from rising in the hierarchy of organizations.
12Goldin (1992) documents that wage discrimination accounted for about 20 percent of the di¤erence in
male and female earnings in manufacturing jobs in early 1900, and about 55 percent for o¢ ce work in 1940:
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Single males and females solve the following maximization problem:
max
1X
t=0
tUj (cjst + gt; 1  ljst)Njst
subject to :
cjst + xjst  [(1   kt) rt +  kt] kjst + (1   lt)wt (1  Ij st) ljst +  jst
Njst+1
Njst
kjst+1  xjst + (1  ) kjst
where, as before, subscripts j 2 ff;mg and t denote gender and time, and subscript s
indicates a single individual. We use similar notational conventions as in the married couples
problem. The indicator function Ij equals 1 if j = f and zero otherwise and is used to show
that single males receive hourly wage rate wt; while single females receive (1   st)wt: Here,
 st 2 (0; 1) represents the exogenous gender wage gap for singles. As before, the parameter
 governs the share of the gender wage gap accounted for by productivity di¤erences. In our
numerical experiments, the gender wage gap for singles,  st, di¤ers from the one for married
couples,  pt, consistent with U.S. data.
There is a representative rm with a constant returns to scale production function that
rents capital, Kt; and pays for e¤ective labor, ~Lt. The rms problem is given below.
maxF

Kt; ~Lt

  rtKt   wt ~Lt (5)
subject to: F

Kt; ~Lt

= Kt

t ~Lt
1 
There is labor augmenting technical progress at a constant yearly rate of    1; that is,
t = 0
t. The aggregate resource constraints for capital and e¤ective labor are below.
Kt = kptNpt + kfstNfst + kmstNmst
~Lt = lmptNpt + (1   pt) lfptNpt + (1   st) lfstNfst + lmstNmst
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The wage bill in (5) is given by wt ~Lt: Here, wt is the wage rate per unit of e¤ective
labor and also the wage rate per hour worked by men. In the expression for ~Lt; the terms
(1   it) for i 2 fp; sg measure the productivity of a married or single woman relative to
men. Recall that women do not get paid their marginal product of wt (1   it), but receive
the lower hourly wage rate of wt (1   it) due to discrimination (as seen in equation (4) for
married women). The di¤erence between their marginal product and the wage rate received
is equal to wt (1  )  it; and is collected by the government as revenue from discrimination.
The resource constraint in the economy is: F

Kt; ~Lt

= Ct +Xt +Gt; where aggregate
consumption is Ct  Npt (cmpt + cfpt) + Nmstcmst + Nfstcfst; aggregate investment is Xt 
Nptxpt+Nmstxmst+Nfstxfst andGt  Ntgt denotes government spending. In the quantitative
analysis, the government consumption is exogenous and varies over time.
The government collects revenues from discrimination and from capital and labor in-
come taxation. Revenues are used for government consumption expenditures and lump-sum
rebates to households. The lifetime budget constraint of the government is:
1X
t=0
1
t
(	t +Gt) =
1X
t=0
1
t
f[ ktrt    kt]Kt + tg
where t 
8><>: 1 for t = 0Qt
&=1 (1   +R&) for t  0
(6)
where, Rt  (1   kt) rt +  kt; aggregate transfers are 	t  Npt pt + Nfst fst + Nmst mst;
and aggregate labor revenues, t; are dened in (7).
t  [ ltwtNptlmpt +  ltwtNmstlmst +  lt (1   pt)wtNptlfpt +  lt (1   st)wtNfstlfst]
+ [wt (1  )  ptNptlfpt + wt (1  )  stNfstlfst] (7)
The rst four terms in equation (7) represent revenues collected from labor income tax-
ation. In addition, womens labor income is subject to discrimination which raises revenues
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equal to wt (1  )  ptNptlfpt + wt (1  )  stNfstlfst.
In our quantitative experiments, we allow the e¤ective labor income taxes,  lt; the gender
wage gaps,  st and  pt; the government consumption, gt; and the population fractions, npt 
Npt=Nt; nfst  Nfst=Nt; nmst  Nmst=Nt; to vary exogenously over time. We allow the
population fractions to vary since there has been a large increase in the fraction of singles
and a corresponding decline in the fraction of married couples since 1961: These time-varying
inputs are measured from U.S. data (see Figure 2) and discussed in Section 4:
3.1 Aggregation and the Labor Wedge
We derive the labor wedge in our model and show that it depends on taxes, as suggested
by previous studies, and on gender wage gaps, female labor supplies and aggregate labor
supply. In Section 4, we evaluate the quantitative importance of taxes and gender wage gaps
in accounting for the changes in U.S. labor wedge and hours worked.
To obtain an expression for the labor wedge we aggregate the models intratemporal
labor equilibrium conditions for married and single men and for married and single women,
summarized in equations (8) and (9), respectively.
 (cmit + gt)
1  lmit = (1   lt)wt; for i 2 fp; sg (8)
 (cfit + gt)
1  lfit = (1   lt) (1   it)wt; for i 2 fp; sg (9)
We multiply each of the intratemporal conditions by the fraction of households of that
type (i.e. the fraction of married couples, npt; and the fractions of singles, nfst and nmst)
and sum up to obtain equation (10) : A full derivation in provided in Appendix A:2.
 (ct + gt)
1  lt = (1   lt)

1  npt pt (1  lfpt) + nfst st (1  lfst)
1  lt

(1  ) yt
~lt
(10)
Here, ct = Ct=Nt denotes aggregate private consumption per person, gt = Gt=Nt denotes
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public consumption per person; lt = nptlmpt + nptlfpt + nmstlmst + nfstlfst denotes aggregate
hours worked per person, ~lt = ~Lt=Nt denotes aggregate e¤ective hours per person and yt =
F

Kt; ~Lt

=Nt denotes output per person.
Combining equation (10) with the denition of the labor wedge given in equation (1) ;
we can rewrite 1 t as in (11) :
1 t = (1   lt)

1  npt pt (1  lfpt) + nfst st (1  lfst)
1  lt

lt
~lt
(11)
The aggregate labor wedge, t; depends on endogenous labor supply decisions of the
households, as well as time-varying exogenous inputs of the model such as taxes, gender
wage gaps and fractions of females in the total population. Notice that  the parameter
that governs the share of the gender wage gap accounted for by productivity di¤erences
enters equation (11) indirectly through ~lt: When  = 1; the gender gap is due entirely to
productivity di¤erences between men and women. Then, changes in the labor wedge reect
changes in distortionary taxes, as well as changes in non-distortionary factors, such as the
relative productivity of women, as discussed in the static example in Section 2. When
 = 0; the gender gap is due entirely to discrimination which can be interpreted as another
distortion that a¤ects the changes in the labor wedge.
We briey discuss the models predictions for the labor wedge under various scenarios. A
more detailed analysis is provided in Section 4. First, consider the case when men and women
earn the same wage and are equally productive (i.e.  pt =  st = 0). Moreover, assume that:
(i) initial wealth and lifetime transfers are proportional to the lifetime labor income of each
household and (ii) the individuals in the married couple have equal utility weights: m = f :
Then, the model reduces to a standard growth model with taxes, as in Prescott (2004) and
Ohanian, Ra¤o, and Rogerson (2008). That is, equation (11) simplies to: 1 t = 1   lt.
Since taxes,  lt; increased in U.S. data in the last 50 years, the labor wedge, t; generated
under this scenario increases, contrary to what was observed in U.S. data.
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Now, consider the more interesting case in which the gender wage gaps are positive (i.e.
 pt > 0;  st > 0). For simplicity, assume that our model has only married couples and
no single households, and that the gender wage gap is due entirely to discrimination (i.e.
 = 0). Equation (11) simplies to: 1 t = (1   lt) [1  0:5   pt (1  lfpt) = (1  lt)] : Can
the model deliver a labor wedge that declines over time as seen in U.S. data? Recall that
since the early 1960s; the U.S. gender wage gap shrunk and taxes increased. If the model
generates an increase in aggregate hours, lt; and a larger increase in female hours, lfpt; the
term [1  0:5   pt (1  lfpt) = (1  lt)] increases over time. In our quantitative analysis, we
show that this increase dominates the decline in (1   lt) ; and the model delivers a decline
in the labor wedge, t; over time (see Section 4:2 for details).
4 Quantitative Analysis
We evaluate the quantitative contribution of taxes, cross-sectional heterogeneity and other
exogenous inputs to the long-run changes in U.S. hours and the labor wedge. We compute
the equilibrium paths of our model and compare its predictions with U.S. data. In our
baseline experiment, we treat the e¤ective labor income taxes, the gender wage gaps, the
government consumption and population fractions as exogenous, time-varying inputs. We
perform other experiments to isolate the quantitative importance of each factor.
4.1 Baseline Calibration
We calibrate the parameters and the exogenous time-varying inputs so that our baseline
model matches key statistics of the U.S. economy. We use national accounts and xed assets
data, revenue statistics and survey data for the U.S., as described in detail in Appendix A:1.
Unless otherwise noted, we use data for the years 1961 to 2007:
The time-varying exogenous inputs of our model are presented in Figure 2. The ef-
fective labor income taxes are dened as in Prescott (2004) and Shimer (2009). Namely,
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 lt  1   (1  ht) = (1 +  ct) ; where ht and  ct are labor income and consumption tax
rates constructed following the methodology of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994). The
interpretation of this e¤ective tax is that one additional unit of pre-tax labor income buys
(1  ht) = (1 +  ct) units of consumption, after labor and consumption taxes are paid for.
The government consumption to output ratio is constructed using national accounts data.
The gender wage gaps for married and single individuals,  pt and  st; are measured using
microdata from the Current Population Survey (CPS) as detailed in Appendix A:1. Lastly,
the population fractions, npt; nfst; nmst, are also measured from the CPS.
The calibrated parameters are presented in Table 1. We choose  to match the average
population growth rate and  to match the average growth rate of labor augmenting technical
change over the 47 year period. We choose  and  to match the average capital income
share and the average annual depreciation rate, respectively. We set  k to the average capital
income tax for the U.S. since 1970: The discount factor is chosen to match a steady state
after-tax net return (1   k) r +  k    of 4 percent.
We use the following utility function: Uf = Um = U = 11 
n
[(c+ g)  (1  l)]1    1
o
:
We follow Prescott (2004) and Ohanian, Ra¤o, and Rogerson (2008) and set the intertem-
poral substitution parameter, ; and the government consumption parameter, ; to 1. In
Section 4:2:5, we perform sensitivity analysis with respect to these parameters. The leisure
parameter, ; and the utility weight f are calibrated so that the aggregate labor supply
and married female labor supply in the initial period in the model are consistent with U.S.
data on hours worked in 1961. Labor supply in the model is expressed as a fraction of avail-
able time worked. Given 100 hours of available time per week, our calibration ensures that
l1961  100 equals 24:6 hours and lfp1961  100 equals 10:3 hours, as observed in U.S. data in
1961. Once  and f are calibrated, the levels of hours for the other individuals for the year
1961 are determined in equilibrium.
The initial wealth of each household, kp0; kfs0 and kms0; is set to be proportional to labor
income in 1961: Lifetime transfers are set to be proportional to the total labor income plus
19
initial capital stock wealth earned by each household. This choice of distributing transfers
does not alter the ratios of lifetime income between the three groups of households.13
In our baseline calibration, we assume that the gender gap is entirely due to discrimination
(i.e.  = 0). We also consider how our results change when the gender gap is accounted for
entirely by productivity di¤erences between males and females (i.e.  = 1).
4.2 Results
We show that our model is able to replicate the trends in average hours worked for men
and women, by marital status, as observed in U.S. data. Moreover, we measure the labor
wedge generated in the model and show that it declines over time, consistent with U.S. data.
We report results from multiple experiments in order to isolate the relative importance of
the di¤erent factors considered: taxes, gender wage gaps, government consumption ratio and
population fractions. In Section 5, we discuss other factors that may be important for labor
supply, such as child care costs, home production and leisure time.
4.2.1 Baseline Experiment: Predictions for Hours and the Labor Wedge
In our baseline model the exogenous inputs taxes, gender wage gaps, government consump-
tion ratio and population fractions are set to match their counterparts in U.S. data (see
Figure 2). The model delivers an increase in aggregate and womens hours worked and a
decline in the labor wedge (Figure 3). The solid lines in the left side panels of the gure
show weekly hours worked by males and females in the U.S. economy between 1961 and 2007:
The dashed lines show the baseline model results for hours worked (e.g. for married males,
we plot lmpt  100 where lmpt is the fraction of time worked and 100 represents the available
13Our assumptions on the initial wealth and lifetime transfers guarantee that, if gender wage gaps
are zero and m = f , our model reduces to a standard growth model with taxes. These assump-
tions are motivated by the fact that the equilibrium level of households hours worked depends on the
initial wealth and lifetime transfers. To see this, note that the lifetime budget constraints for sin-
gles of gender j 2 ff;mg are: P1t=0Njst 1t cjst  P1t=0 nNjst 1t (1   lt)wt (1  Ij st) ljst +  jsto +
Njs0 (1   + (1  k0) r0 + k0) kjs0, where t is dened as in equation (6) and Ij = 1 if j = f and zero
otherwise.
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hours per week). The model is successful in matching the level of hours and in accounting
for the changes in hours over time. Recall that aggregate hours and married females hours
in 1961 are matched through the choice of  and f . The levels of hours worked for married
males, single males and single females in 1961 are not pinned down in the calibration, but are
determined in equilibrium. While the model does not match these levels exactly, it delivers
the same ranking of hours among the di¤erent population groups as in the data for the year
1961. For example, in the data, a single male worked about 26 percent more than a single
female in year 1961, while the comparable gure in the model is 25 percent.
The upper right panel of Figure 3 plots aggregate weekly hours worked in the data and
in the baseline model (variable lt). The model predicts correctly very little changes in hours
between 1960 and 1980; and an increase in hours afterwards. In the data, the overall increase
in hours since 1960 was 13:3 percent, while the model delivers an increase of 8:4%: An obvious
discrepancy between the model and the data is seen during the 1990s: In the data, aggregate
hours worked increase, while the model predicts a decline during this period due to the
increase in observed taxes.14 Lastly, as seen in the lower right panel of Figure 3; the model
delivers a decline in the labor wedge since the early 1980s.
4.2.2 Baseline Experiment: Detailed Predictions for Hours
Table 2 presents a detailed comparison of hours worked in the data and the model. We
decompose changes in aggregate hours worked per person between 1961 and 2007 as:
l2007
l1961
=
np2007lmp2007
l1961
+
nms2007lms2007
l1961
+
nfs2007lfs2007
l1961
+
np2007lfp2007
l1961
(12)
where each term represents the share of hours of a particular group of the population:
married males, single males, single females and married females. Each term in (12) can be
decomposed further into the change in the groups fraction of the total population between
14This counterfactual prediction for hours worked during the 1990s is also present in a standard growth
model with a representative household. McGrattan and Prescott (2010) show that the U.S. hours boom
observed in the 1990s is no longer puzzling after accounting for intangible investment.
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1961 and 2007, the groups share in aggregate hours in 1961 and the change in the groups
hours between 1961 and 2007: For example, for single females we have:
nfs2007lfs2007
l1961
=

nfs2007
nfs1961



nfs1961  lfs1961
l1961



lfs2007
lfs1961

:
The baseline model matches the decomposition of aggregate hours well, as seen in Table
2: The fractions of married couples and singles in the total population are exogenous inputs
into the baseline model, which means that changes in these fractions are matched exactly.
Regarding the distribution of hours in U.S. data, in 1961 married men accounted for about
64 percent of hours worked, single men and women accounted for about 10 percent each, and
married women for about 17 percent. In the model, the share of hours of each group in the
aggregate hours is tightly linked to their predicted level of hours in the initial period. For
example, singles contribute slightly more to aggregate hours in 1961 compared to the data,
because the model predicts slightly higher hours for them in 1961 (see Figure 3). By the
same token, the share of hours of married females in aggregate hours are matched almost
exactly. Regarding changes in hours, the model predicts that hours worked by males fall by
more than in the data, but hours worked by females increase similarly to what was observed.
4.2.3 Baseline Experiment: Detailed Predictions for the Labor Wedge
Table 3 presents details on the models labor factor, 1 t. Although for most of the paper
we discuss changes in the labor wedge, t; Table 3 focuses on the labor factor because its
changes over time can be decomposed into several multiplicative components. First, using
equation (1) and  = 1, we can decompose changes in the labor factor into two components:
the consumption to output ratio, (ct + gt) =yt and an aggregate labor component (or an
aggregate labor to leisure ratio), lt= (1  lt) : Notice that changes over time in the labor factor
do not depend on the leisure parameter, ; or on the capital income share, : Our baseline
model predicts an increase of 6:6 percent in the labor factor (which is equivalent to a decline
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of about 10:5 percent in the labor wedge). All of the increase in the models labor factor
is driven by an increase in the aggregate labor component, while the models consumption
to output ratio declines. When measured using U.S. data, the labor factor increases by
more between 1961 and 2007; partly due to an increase in the consumption to output ratio,
and partly due to a larger increase in the aggregate labor component. This decomposition
underscores one of the counterfactual predictions of the model: the consumption to output
ratio declines in the model, while it increased in U.S. data.15 We will show this result is
robust: the model is unable to deliver both an increase in aggregate hours and an increase
in the consumption to output ratio, as observed in U.S. data.
A second decomposition of the labor factor from our baseline model makes use of equation
(11) and is also presented in Table 3. Changes in the labor factor are now determined by
changes in a tax rate component, 1    lt; and changes in a female labor component given
by 1  npt pt(1 lfpt)+nfst st(1 lfst)
1 lt . Recall that the baseline model attributes all of the gender
wage gaps to discrimination (i.e.  = 0), which means that the labor input equals the
e¤ective labor (i.e. lt=~lt = 1). The rst lesson from this decomposition is that the increase
of 6:6 percent in the labor factor in the baseline model is driven entirely by the female
labor component. The exogenous e¤ective tax rate component, 1    lt; leads to a decline
in the labor factor. The female labor component depends on inputs that are exogenous to
the model, such as gender wage gaps and fractions of females in the population, but also
on endogenous labor supply decisions of women and on the aggregate labor supply. In the
model, the female component increases by about 15 percent over time, which is close to
the increase obtained when we evaluate the expression using U.S. data. The takeaway from
Table 3 is that a model with changes in gender wage gaps only, and no changes in e¤ective
taxes predicts a larger increase in the labor factor (or a larger decline in the labor wedge).
15We note that the predicted consumption to output ratio declines over time, even if we add time-varying
total factor productivity (TFP) to the model. Moreover, allowing for time-varying TFP leaves the predicted
decline in the labor wedge essentially unchanged.
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4.2.4 Additional Experiments
We perform additional experiments to show that shrinking gender wage gaps are an impor-
tant driving force for our results. Unless otherwise noted, we use the same parameters in
these experiments as given in Table 1. In Figure 4, we plot the results from an experiment
in which only gender wage gaps are allowed to vary over time, as measured from U.S. data.
All other exogenous inputs shown in Figure 2 are held xed at their 1961 levels. Overall,
the predictions from this experiment for hours of males and females, as well as aggregate
hours are closer to U.S. data. The main reason for the improved predictions is that e¤ective
income tax rates do not vary over time. As a result, the model predicts a smaller decline in
male hours and a slightly larger increase in females hours compared to the baseline model.
Moreover, the labor wedge declines by nearly twice as much as in the baseline experiment.
The main di¤erence is again due to taxes.
Figure 5 reports results from an experiment in which the gender wage gaps are held xed
at their 1961 levels. All other exogenous inputs taxes, government consumption ratio and
fractions of households shown in Figure 2 are allowed to vary over time. Without shrinking
gender wage gaps, the model fails to generate increases in womens hours worked. In fact,
hours worked for all groups decline marginally over time due to increases in e¤ective labor
income taxes. As a result, the model fails to capture the observed increase in aggregate
hours worked. Moreover, the increase in the labor wedge is inconsistent with U.S. data. The
predictions of this experiment are similar to the predictions of a standard growth model with
a representative household and time-varying taxes.
Some additional experiments are summarized in Table 4 and compared with the experi-
ments we already discussed. We present predictions for aggregate hours, lt; married womens
hours, lfpt; the labor wedge, t; and the consumption to output ratio, (ct + gt) =yt. Neither
of the experiments can account for the observed increase in the consumption to output ratio.
This result a¤ects negatively the predictions for the labor wedge as discussed earlier (see
Table 3). Our baseline model accounts for about 63 percent of the increase in aggregate
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hours worked per week, 83 percent of the increase in married womens hours, while it ac-
counts for only 30 percent of the decline in the labor wedge. Among the experiments with
only one time-varying input, the experiment with changes in gender wage gaps performs the
best. It accounts for 95 percent of the increase in aggregate hours and about 54 percent
of the decline in the labor wedge. The experiment with changes in e¤ective taxes alone
has counterfactual predictions for labor supply and for the labor wedge. The experiment in
which we allow only the fractions of married couples and singles to vary over time delivers
an increase in labor supply, but for the wrong reasons. In this experiment, the hours of all
individuals increase slightly over time. The increase in the models aggregate hours is then
driven mainly by singles, since the fractions of singles increases signicantly between 1961
and 2007; as observed in U.S. data.
4.2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We perform sensitivity analysis with respect to ;  and :
In all experiments discussed so far, we assumed that males and females are equally
productive, and the gender wage gaps are due entirely to discrimination, i.e.  = 0. We
perform an experiment in which all exogenous inputs vary over time, but we assume the
gender wage gaps are due entirely to productivity di¤erences between females and males,
i.e.  = 1. We recalibrate parameters  and f to match the same targets on hours worked
as in the baseline calibration, but keep all other parameters unchanged. We nd that a
model with  = 1 implies fairly similar changes in hours worked for males and females (see
Table 4). Aggregate hours go up by 7:4 percent compared to 8:4 percent in the baseline
model. The decline in the labor wedge is slightly smaller in this experiment compared to the
baseline. Recall that using equation (11) the labor factor, 1  t; can be decomposed into
three factors as shown at the bottom of Table 3. When  = 1; the ratio lt=~lt is less than
one, leading to slightly smaller increases (decreases) in the labor factor (labor wedge).16
16Our results are approximately linear in the value of : The results from our baseline experiment (which
has  = 0) and from the experiment with  = 1 provide upper and lower bounds on how successful the
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In our baseline calibration, the elasticity of substitution, , and the marginal rate of
substitution between public and private consumption, , are equated to 1. We report quan-
titative results of our baseline model for di¤erent values of  or  in Table 5. In each
experiment, we recalibrate parameters  and f to match the same targets on hours worked
as in the baseline calibration.
The choice of  impacts the models Frisch elasticities of labor supplies for men and
women.17 With  = 1, the aggregate Frisch elasticity is about 3. For  2 (0; 1), the Frisch
elasticities are larger and the model appears more successful at predicting the change in
aggregate hours, but for the wrong reasons. The predicted hours for males decline due to
higher taxes by much more than observed in U.S. data, while the predicted hours for married
females have a counterfactually strong increase in response to the shrinking gender wage gap.
For  > 1; hours worked respond less to changes in taxes and gender gaps. The predictions
for the labor wedge do not change as much as hours do in response to changes in , since
the labor wedge also reects declines in the consumption to output ratio (see Table 5).
The value of  has little impact on the models predictions for hours or the labor wedge.
However,  a¤ects the measurement of the labor wedge from the data. A lower value of 
corresponds to a larger increase in ct+gt
yt
from 1961 to 2007 and a larger decline in the wedge
measured from U.S. data. Varying  from 0 to 1, our model accounts for 25 to 30 percent
of the observed changes in the U.S. labor wedge (see Table 5).
We conclude that the elasticity of substitution  = 1 seems appropriate for our model, as
it implies an aggregate labor supply elasticity consistent with other macro studies, such as
Prescott (2004) and Ohanian, Ra¤o, and Rogerson (2008). Moreover, the particular choices
of  the fraction of the gender wage gaps accounted for by productivity di¤erences or 
model is. For example, an experiment in which all exogenous inputs are allowed to vary over time, but the
value of  equals 0:5; predicts that aggregate hours increase by 7:9 percent and the labor wedge declines by
9:4 percent. These values are about midway between the results from the baseline model and the experiment
with  = 1 (see Table 4).
17For the utility function we consider, 11 
n
[(c+ g)  (1  l)]1    1
o
with  > 0, the Frisch elasticity
equals 1 ll  11  1  :
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the marginal rate of substitution between public and private consumption do not overturn
our conclusion that the gender wage gap is an important driving force behind the long-run
changes in U.S. hours and the labor wedge from 1961 to 2007.
5 Other Considerations
We have shown that a model with shrinking gender wage gaps for married couples and
singles is successful in delivering an increase in U.S. hours worked and a decline in the U.S.
labor wedge, despite the observed increase in U.S. e¤ective labor income taxes. Our baseline
model accounts for 63 percent of the increase in aggregate hours, 86 percent of the increase
in married womens hours and 30 percent of the decline in the labor wedge. In this section,
we briey discuss other factors such as changes in child care costs, leisure time or home
production which may be able to further improve the quantitative predictions of our model
for U.S. hours worked and the labor wedge.
5.1 Changes in Child Care Costs
Incorporating reductions in child care costs over time in our model has the potential to deliver
a larger increase in the hours of married women, and hence a larger decline in the labor wedge
(see equation 11). Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos (2008) show that reductions in child
care costs along with reductions in the gender wage gap over time help explain the increase
in participation rates of females in the U.S. The idea is that, in the past, child care costs
were very high and mothers stayed at home after birth to care for their children. Thus, the
rise in married womens labor supply is really a story about their wages increasing, as well
as the number of children and the child care costs decreasing.
We extend our baseline model to allow for reductions in child care costs and evaluate
the quantitative implications for hours and the labor wedge. We model child care services
as a cost paid by the married couple. The married female decides how many hours, lfpt; to
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work given the wage rate, (1   pt)wt; she receives and given the hourly cost of child care
services, t: The new sequential budget constraints of the married couple are given below.
cfpt+cmpt+xpt  [(1   kt) rt +  kt] kpt+(1   lt)wtlmpt+[(1   lt)wt (1   pt)  t] lfpt+ pt
The new resource constraint is: Ct +Xt + t +Gt = F

Kt; ~Lt

, where t are the total
resources spent on child care: t = nptlfptt:
The intratemporal condition for married females changes to (13), while the intratemporal
conditions for married males, single males and single women remain unchanged.
 (cfpt + gt)
1  lfpt = (1   lt) (1   pt)wt   t (13)
We perform an experiment that features all time-varying inputs from our baseline model,
plus changes in child care costs. We recalibrate parameters  and f ; so that the model
with child care costs matches the same targets for hours worked as discussed in the baseline
calibration. All other parameters stay unchanged. To determine t; we use data from
the U.S. Census Bureaus Survey of Income and Program Participation. According to this
survey, the average child care expenditures of families with employed mothers that pay for
such services were 15% of the mothers income in the year 2004.18 Since t are hourly child
care costs, we pick 2004 so that 2004= (w2004 (1   p;2004)) = 0:15: The change in child care
costs from early 1960s to present is harder to measure. Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos
(2008) consider reductions in child care costs that range between  5% to  20%. In our
experiment, we used the midpoint of this range. We pick 1961 such that child care costs as
a fraction of a married females income decline linearly by 12:5% between 1961 and 2004:
The results of this experiment are presented in Table 4. As expected, reductions in child
care costs lead to an increase in hours worked by married females. In our baseline model,
hours of married females increase by a factor of 2:08 between 1961 and 2007:With reductions
18Data are available at: http://www.census.gov, "Whos Minding the Kids? Child Care Arrangements:
Summer 2006", Table 6. The child care expenditures are for families with children 15 years old and younger.
28
in child care costs, married female hours increase by a factor of 2:2. The hours of all other
individuals are comparable across the two experiments. As a result, aggregate hours increase
by a bit more and the labor wedge declines by a bit more over the 47 year period.
To summarize, reductions in child care costs lead to additional increases in aggregate and
womens hours, but contribute only a further 6 percentage points to the decline in the labor
wedge observed in the U.S. since early 1960s.
5.2 Changes in Time Devoted to Home Production and Leisure
Ohanian, Ra¤o, and Rogerson (2008) suggest that the counterfactual predictions of the
neoclassical growth model for U.S. hours can potentially be reconciled by taking into account
changes in the amount of time devoted to home production. In their representative agent
model (as well as in the model presented in this paper), hours worked in the market and
leisure time are mirror images of each other. In U.S. data, leisure time depends not only on
time spent at work, but also on time spent in non-market activities such as home production.
Therefore, a model that accounts for the decline in home production observed in the U.S. in
the past 50 years has a better chance of matching the increase in U.S. hours worked.
We illustrate that changes in home production and leisure time help improve the predic-
tions of our model for U.S. hours and the labor wedge. A back of the envelope calculation
suggests that this mechanism can only account for part of the changes in the labor wedge and
is thus complimentary to the mechanism we presented in this paper. To see this, consider
the case in which our baseline model reduces to a standard growth model (i.e. all individuals
are the same). The labor equilibrium condition is given below:
 (ct + gt)
leisuret
= (1   lt) (1  ) yt
lt
(14)
where leisure is now allowed to include time spent in non-market activities, i.e. leisuret 
1  lt  (non-market hours)t. What is the change needed in leisure time in order for equation
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(14) to be consistent with the data? U.S. data on taxes, private and public consumption,
output and hours worked shows that (1   lt) declines by 7:5%; (ct + gt) =yt increases by 6:8%
and hours worked increase by 13:3% between 1960 and 2007: Then, leisure time would need
to increase by 31%(= 1:068  113:3=92:5   1) between 1960 and 2007 in order for equation
(14) to hold. That is, a 31 percent increase in leisure time would explain all of the changes
in the labor wedge measured from the neoclassical model (with no non-market hours).
The evidence regarding changes in U.S. leisure time is a bit mixed. Ramey and Francis
(2009) document that leisure time measured as the di¤erence between time available and
time devoted to non-leisure activities (i.e. work, school, home production, commuting and
personal care time) changed little for both males and females since 1960 (see Figure 5 in their
paper). Males aged 25 to 54 reduced average weekly hours worked and increased the time
spent in home production between 1960 and 2005 (see Tables 2 and 4 in their paper). Over
the same time period, females in the same age group increased their weekly hours worked,
while reducing the time spent in home production. In contrast, Aguiar and Hurst (2007)
document that, over a similar time period, leisure time has increased anywhere from four to
eight hours per week for males and females of working age (see Table III in their paper). As
pointed out by Ramey and Francis, some of the di¤erences in estimates are due to di¤erent
denitions of leisure. Both studies document that average time spent in home production in
the U.S. declined since the 1960s. The larger estimates provided by Aguiar and Hurst (2007)
show an increase in leisure time of about 5:4 to 15 percent between 1965 and 2003, while the
estimates provided by Ramey and Francis (2009) show an increase of barely 2 percent.
To summarize, a model where leisure time accounts for non-market hours can help im-
prove the predictions of our model for the U.S. labor wedge.19 We view this mechanism as
complementary to the one presented in our paper, since increases in leisure time alone can
account for 6:5 to 50 percent of the decline in the U.S. labor wedge.
19The link between home production and the labor wedge is studied by Karabarbounis (2014a) in an
international business cycle model. His estimated model is able to generate a labor wedge volatility and
persistence consistent with cross country data.
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6 International Evidence
A natural questions is whether the mechanism we analyzed in detail for the U.S. is also
important in other economies. In this section, we show that shrinking gender wage gaps
and labor income taxes are important drivers of the long-run changes in the Canadian and
German labor wedges. Our choice of countries is limited by the availability of long-run micro
survey data which allows us to construct hourly wage rates and hours worked by gender and
marital status. However, we show that our mechanism is broadly consistent with aggregate
data for other OECD economies.
Our quantitative exercise for Canada and Germany is similar to that performed for the
U.S. in Table 3 (see column labeled "Data"). First, we use equation (1) and aggregate data
on private and public consumption, output and average hours worked to measure changes in
the labor factor, 1 t. Second, we use tax rates and micro survey data to measure the tax
component and the female labor component given in equation (11). The results and sources
of data for Canada and Germany are presented in Table 6.
Results for Canada are very similar to those for the U.S. economy. From 1971 to 2012,
the labor factor in Canada, 1 t, increased or, equivalently, the labor wedge, t, declined.
Over the same time period, e¤ective labor income taxes increased, aggregate and womens
hours worked increased, mens hours worked were relatively stable and the gender wage gaps
for married couples and singles shrunk. A neoclassical growth model with only taxes has
counterfactual predictions for Canada. The increase in e¤ective labor income taxes implies a
decline in aggregate hours and an increase in the labor wedge. Hence, shrinking gender wage
gaps are needed to capture the increase in female and aggregate hours worked. Moreover,
the decomposition in Table 6 shows that the female labor component alone, which captures
changes in gender wage gaps and female hours worked, can account for about two-thirds
of the increase in the labor factor. When considered together, the tax component and the
female labor component can account for about a quarter of the increase in the labor factor.
The German example is especially interesting because from 1983 to 2007, the labor factor,
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1 t, declined or, equivalently, the labor wedge, t, increased (Table 6). Aggregate hours
worked and married womens hours worked increased, while single womens and mens hours
worked were relatively stable. The gender wage gap for married couples shrunk, while
the gender wage gap for singles was relatively stable. Finally, e¤ective labor income taxes
increased. Can the German data be reconciled with our mechanism? Yes. E¤ective labor
income taxes alone predict an increase in the labor wedge, t, that is larger than observed.
In addition, higher taxes imply a counterfactual decline in hours worked. Hence, the closing
of the gender wage gap for married females is important in understanding why aggregate
and married femaleshours have gone up. Moreover, cross-sectional heterogeneity in hours
and wages captured in the female labor component brings the model labor wedge closer
to that measured from German aggregate data.
We extend our analysis to other OECD economies where gender wage gaps shrunk, as
documented by Blau and Kahn (2000). While we do not have long-run micro survey data
for these economies, Table 7 shows that our mechanism is broadly consistent with aggregate
data on hours worked, tax rates and measured labor wedges for a number of other OECD
economies. In economies with large changes in aggregate and womens hours and the labor
wedge, cross-sectional heterogeneity can be quantitatively important in reversing the e¤ects
of higher taxes (as observed in Spain, Italy and Belgium), or in accounting for reductions
in labor wedges which are larger than reductions in tax rates (as observed in Netherlands,
Finland and the U.K.).
To summarize, for a number of countries U.S., Canada, Germany, Netherlands, Spain,
Finland, Italy,U.K. and Belgium reductions in cross-sectional heterogeneity in wages and
hours can contribute to increases in aggregate hours and reductions in the labor wedge, t
(or equivalently, increases in the labor factor, 1 t, as shown in Tables 3, 6 and 7).
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7 Conclusion
From the early 1960s to 2007, the U.S. labor wedge measured as the discrepancy between
a representative households marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
and the marginal product of labor declined substantially. Over the same time period, U.S.
aggregate hours worked increased, due to an increase in womens hours worked. These obser-
vations are puzzling from the perspective of a standard neoclassical growth model because
they were accompanied by an increase in U.S. e¤ective labor income taxes.
In this paper, we show that incorporating household heterogeneity in productivity and
hours worked in an otherwise standard growth model is important in accounting for the
long-run trends in U.S. hours and the labor wedge. We show that large cross-sectional dif-
ferences in productivity and hours worked between households generate a large labor wedge.
Consequently, reductions in cross-sectional di¤erences over time contribute to reductions in
the measured labor wedge. We focus on a particular split of the population, by gender and
marital status, motivated by the increase in womens hours worked and the decline in the
gender wage gaps in the U.S. We show that reductions in gender wage gaps consistent with
U.S. data generate an increase in aggregate and womens hours and a decline in the labor
wedge, in spite of higher taxes.
We provide international support for the mechanism we analyzed in detail for the U.S.
economy. We show that reductions in cross-sectional heterogeneity in wages and hours
worked contribute to reductions in the measured labor wedges in Canada and Germany. In
Canada, similar to the U.S., the closing of the gender wage gaps and increases in female hours
dominate the increase in taxes and lead to a decline in the labor wedge over the last four
decades. Germany is especially interesting, since taxes increased by more than the increase in
the labor wedge over the last two decades. Hence, reductions in cross-sectional heterogeneity
in Germany (captured by the closing of the gender wage gap for married couples and the
increase in married womens hours) are important as they partly reverse the increase in
taxes, bringing the models labor wedge closer to that measured from German aggregate
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data. The improved predictions for the labor wedges lead us to conclude that household
heterogeneity also helps account for the changes in hours worked in Canada and Germany.
Moreover, we illustrate that reductions in cross-sectional heterogeneity in wages and hours
can be important in accounting for the increase in aggregate hours and the reductions in the
measured labor wedges in a broader set of countries.
A Appendix
A.1 U.S. Data
Survey data. We use data from the IPUMS-CPS to construct our measures of average
hours worked and the gender wage gaps. The IPUMS-CPS is based on the March Current
Population Survey and is available yearly since 1962 at http://cps.ipums.org/cps/.
We use the following variables for survey years 1962   2008: PERWT (person weight),
AGE (persons age at last birthday), SEX, MARST (current marital status), EMPSTAT
(current employment status), HRSWORK (hours worked last week), INCWAGE (wage and
salary income last year). We also use WKSWORK1 (weeks worked last year), for 1976 2008
and WKSWORK2 (weeks worked last year in interval format), for 1962  2008.
We construct total hours worked last year as the product of weeks worked and hours
worked per week. Starting 1976; we use the variable WKSWORK1 to obtain weeks worked
for each person. Prior to 1976; the survey provides only an interval for the weeks worked for
each person (variable WKSWORK2). We replace WKSWORK2 with an average number of
weeks worked (given in equation 15) that is calculated based on WKSWORK1 as follows. We
take variable WKSWORK1 and group persons according to their number of weeks worked
into the same intervals provided in variable WKSWORK2. We then compute the average
weeks worked for each of the six intervals from 1976 to 2008. For each interval, the averages
obtained vary very little over time. For example, the average number of weeks worked for
persons working between 1 and 13 weeks was roughly 8 for all years from 1976 to 2008.
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weeks worked, 1962  1975 =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
8:0 if WKSWORK2 is 1  13 weeks
21:7 if WKSWORK2 is 14  26 weeks
33:7 if WKSWORK2 is 27  39 weeks
42:6 if WKSWORK2 is 40  47 weeks
48:3 if WKSWORK2 is 48  49 weeks
51:9 if WKSWORK2 is 50  52 weeks
(15)
We use variable INCWAGE to obtain the wage per hours for each person.
We construct population, employment, average hours worked and median wage per hour
for the total population, married men, married women, single men, single women. Our mea-
sure of married couples includes the following categories from the variable MARST: "married,
spouse present", "married, spouse absent" and "separated". We group the categories "di-
vorced", "widowed" and "never married" under our measure of singles. We use population
ages 20 to 64: We use the median wage per hour because it is not a¤ected by changes in
the top code. To construct employment we take all persons who were employed and at work
during the reference week, all persons who were employed but not at work that week, and
all persons in the Armed Forces (EMPSTAT = 10, 12 and 13, respectively). We construct
hours worked by employed persons using all respondents that report EMPSTAT equal to 10
or 13. The average hours worked per week are then given by: hE  EN  152 ; where hE are hours
worked during the year by employed people, E is the total number of employed persons, and
N is the total population. Our implicit assumption is that persons not at work during the
reference week (i.e. people with EMPSTAT equal to 12) work similar yearly hours to those
at work during the reference week.
The average hours worked we obtain for the total population are very similar to those
reported by Cociuba, Ueberfeldt, and Prescott (2009). Our average hours worked for married
and single individuals di¤er slightly from those reported by McGrattan and Rogerson (2008),
who use population 25  64:
National accounts and xed assets data. We obtain these data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. We make a few adjustments to the national accounts. We treat con-
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sumer durables as investment. We treat government military investment as government
consumption and the remainder of government investment is treated as investment. We also
remove sales taxes from the gross domestic product.
Tax rates. We use data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment to construct tax rates following the methodology of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994).
We use Joines (1981) to extend the series of tax rates before 1970.
A.2 Model Aggregate Intratemporal Condition
Here, we derive the models aggregate intratemporal condition. The model has four intratem-
poral equations for each type of consumer in the economy. We multiply each intratemporal
condition by the fraction of consumers of that type and sum up. We obtain:
 (nptcmpt + nptcfpt + nmstcmst + nfstcfst) + gt (2npt + nmst + nfst) (16)
= (1   lt)wtnpt (1  lmpt) + (1   lt)wtnpt (1   pt) (1  lfpt)
+ (1   lt)wtnmst (1  lmst) + (1   lt)wtnfst (1   st) (1  lfst)
Equation (16) can also be written as  (ct + gt) = (1   lt)wtt; where ct  CtNt denotes
aggregate private consumption per person, and where t is dened as below.
t  2npt+nmst+nfst nptlmpt+npt ( lfpt    pt (1  lfpt)) nmstlmst+nfst ( lfst    st (1  lfst))
t = 1  (nptlmpt + nptlfpt + nmstlmst + nfstlfst)  npt pt (1  lfpt)  nfst st (1  lfst)
In the last expression we used 2npt + nmst + nfst = (2Npt +Nmst +Nfst) =Nt = 1:
Let lt denote aggregate hours worked per person: lt  nptlmpt+nptlfpt+nmstlmst+nfstlfst:
The aggregate intratemporal equation becomes:
 (ct + gt) = (1   lt)wt [1  lt   npt pt (1  lfpt)  nfst st (1  lfst)] :
We divide both sides by (1  lt) and use wt = (1  ) yt=~lt to get:
(ct+gt)
1 lt = (1   lt)

1  npt pt(1 lfpt)+nfst st(1 lfst)
1 lt

(1 )yt
~lt
:
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Figure 1: Hours Worked and The Labor Wedge Measured from U.S. Data
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Figure 2: Time-Varying Model Inputs Measured from U.S. Data
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Figure 3: Hours and the Labor Wedge in Data and Baseline Model
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Figure 4: Model with Shrinking Gender Wage Gaps Only
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Figure 5: Model with Time-Varying Taxes, Government Consumption and
Fractions of Households
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Table 1: Baseline Model Parameters and Time-Varying Inputsy
Parameters Values
Population growth  = 1:013
Technology growth  = 1:017
Capital income share  = 0:33
Depreciation of capital  = 0:05
Capital income tax rate  k = 0:40
Discount factor  = 0:98
Intertemporal substitution  = 1:00
Government consumption parameter  = 1:00
Leisure parameter  = 1:58
Weights in utility, fUf + mUm f = 0:465; m = 1  f
Share of gender gap due to  = 0
productivity di¤erences
Time-Varying Inputs Values (See Figure 2)
E¤ective labor income tax rate  lt =
Consumption Tax + Labor Tax
1+Consumption Tax
Gender wage gaps  it = 1  hourly wage for females at thourly wage for males at t ; i 2 fp; sg
for married (p) and singles (s)
Government consumption to output ratio Gt
Yt
Fractions of married and single households npt =
Npt
Nt
; nfst=
Nfst
Nt
; nmst=NmstNt
yMoments targeted and sources of data are presented in Section 4.1 and Appendix A.1. In most experiments,
we assume  = 0. We also present results for  = 1.
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Table 2: Baseline Model: Changes in Weekly Hours Worked, 1961 to 2007
Changes in Aggregate Weekly Hours workedy:
l2007=l1961=
P
2fmp;ms;fs;fpg

n2007
n1961
 n1961l1961
l1961
 l2007
l1961

Data: l2007=l1961 = 1:133
Male Female
Contribution of group  Married Single Single Married
Change in fraction of population, n2007
n1961
0:743 2:364 1:803 0:743
Share of aggregate hours in 1961, n1961l1961
l1961
0:641 0:097 0:098 0:169
Change in hours worked, l2007
l1961
0:913 0:964 1:122 2:258
Baseline Model: l2007=l1961 = 1:084
Male Female
Contribution of group  Married Single Single Married
Change in fraction of population, n2007
n1961
0:743 2:364 1:803 0:743
Share of aggregate hours in 1961, n1961l1961
l1961
0:589 0:119 0:122 0:169
Change in hours worked, l2007
l1961
0:822 0:804 1:069 2:083
yChanges in aggregate hours are decomposed into the contributions of the di¤erent groups in the population:
married males (mp), single males (ms), single females (fs) and married females (fp). For ease in writing the
formula in this table, we have used notation which is not used in the main text. The number of married males
and married females are denoted here by Nmpt and Nfpt, respectively, whereas the main text just refers to
the number of married couples, Npt. Also, here nmpt Nmpt=Nt and nfpt Nfpt=Nt. The fractions of
married couples and singles in the total population are exogenous inputs into the baseline model, hence the
model matches the changes in these fractions by construction.
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Table 3: Baseline Model: Changes in the Labor Factor, 1961 to 2007y
Labor Factor, 1 t  (1 ) (ct+gt)yt lt1 lt = (1   lt)

1  npt pt(1 lfpt)+nfst st(1 lfst)
1 lt

lt
~lt
Changes in Labor Factor and Components
Baseline Modela Datab
Labor Factor, 1 t 1:0661 1:2660
Consumption to output ratio, (ct+gt)
yt
0:9570 1:0687
Aggregate labor component, lt
1 lt 1:1141 1:1847
Tax component, 1   lt 0:9252 0:9252
Female labor component, 1  npt pt(1 lfpt)+nfst st(1 lfst)
1 lt 1:1523 1:1543
Labor input to e¤ective labor ratio, lt=~lt 1
yThe expressions for the models labor factor are from Equations (1) and (11). aThe column "Baseline
Model" reports calculations using data generated from the baseline model. This model attributes all of the
gender wage gap to discrimination, so there are no di¤erences between the labor input, lt, and e¤ective
labor, ~lt.
bThe column "Data" shows the changes in the labor factor and components as measured using
U.S. data. Detailed data sources are provided in Appendix A.1. To measure the labor factor, we use U.S.
data on private consumption, government consumption, output and aggregate hours worked. Notice that
 and  a¤ect the level of the labor factor, but not its changes over time. For other calculations reported
in the column "Data", we also use data on female hours worked, taxes, gender wage gaps and fractions of
single and married women in the total population.
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Table 4: Comparison: Baseline Model and Other Experimentsy
Percent change: 1961  2007
lt lfpt t
ct+gt
yt
Data 13:3 125:8  36:5 6:9
Experiments with Baseline Calibration
Baseline Model 8:4 108:3  10:5  4:3
One Time-Varying Input Only
Gender wage gaps 12:7 110:8  19:6  4:6
E¤ective labor income taxes  3:3  7:7 12:1  3:2
Government consumption 2:7 6:4 0:0  3:5
Fractions of households 5:9 4:2  6:8  3:5
All Inputs Except Gender Wage Gaps  0:3  13:0 5:7  3:2
Other Experiments: All Time-Varying Inputs
Gender Gaps Due to Productivity ( = 1) 7:4 108:8  7:8  5:6
Reductions in Child Care Costs 11:4 122:0  12:7  5:1
yWe perform a number of experiments under the baseline calibration. In the experiments with only a subset
of time-varying inputs, the householdslump-sum transfers are distributed in the same proportions as in the
baseline model. Recalibrating the transfers does not change the results signicantly. In the experiment with
 = 1 and the experiment with child care costs, we recalibrate  and f (to match the same targets on
hours worked as in the baseline calibration), but leave all other parameters unchanged. The results from
experiments marked with a star are plotted in Figures 3, 4, and 5, respectively.
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Table 5: Baseline Model: Sensitivity Analysisy
Percent change: 1961  2007
lt lfpt t
ct+gt
yt
Vary 
Data,  = 1 13:3 125:8  36:5 6:9
Baseline Model
 = 0:8 and  = 1 10:5 173:4  11:5  6:2
 = 1:0 and  = 1 8:4 108:3  10:5  4:3
 = 1:2 and  = 1 7:2 85:7  10:2  3:1
Vary 
 = 0 and  = 1
Data 13:3 125:8  42:2 10:6
Baseline Model 7:5 107:4  10:5  3:6
 = 0:5 and  = 1
Data 13:3 125:8  38:9 8:5
Baseline Model 8:0 107:9  10:5  3:9
yWe examine the predictions of our baseline model (in which all exogenous inputs from Figure 2 vary over
time) when we change the values of the elasticity of substitution, , and the values of the marginal rate of
substitution between private and public consumption, . In each case, we recalibrate  and f to match
the same targets on hours worked as in the baseline calibration.
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Table 6: International Evidence: Long-Run Changes in the Labor Wedge in
Canada (1971-2012) and Germany (1983-2007)y
Labor Factor, 1 t  (1 ) (ct+gt)yt lt1 lt = (1   lt)

1  npt pt(1 lfpt)+nfst st(1 lfst)
1 lt

lt
~lt
Changes in Labor Factor and Components
Canadaa Germanyb
Labor Factor, 1 t 1:2283 0:9505
Consumption to output ratio, (ct+gt)
yt
1:0134 0:8989
Aggregate labor component, lt
1 lt 1:2121 1:0574
Tax component, 1   lt 0:9148 0:9183
Female labor component, 1  npt pt(1 lfpt)+nfst st(1 lfst)
1 lt 1:1495 1:0381
Product of tax and female labor components 1:0516 0:9533
yThe expressions for the models labor factor are from Equations (1) and (11). We use Canadian or German
data to measure changes in the labor factor and components. Note that  and  a¤ect the level of the
labor factor, but not its changes over time, hence we do not need values for these parameters to perform the
calculations. Also, note that we have used =1 for the marginal rate of substitution between government
and private consumption. Choosing =0 results in very small changes in the consumption to output ratio,
and very small changes to the labor factor. The growth factor for the labor factor in Canada would be
1.2170 instead of 1.2283, while for Germany it would be 0.9684 instead of 0.9505. aData sources for Canada:
OECD National Accounts and Tax Revenues statistics, National Accounts data from Statistics Canada,
and microdata from the Labor Force Survey and the Census. bData sources for Germany: OECD National
Accounts and Tax Revenues statistics, Regional Accounts VGRdL available at www.vgrdl.de, and microdata
available from the German Cross-National Equivalent File, see Frick, Jenkins, Lillard, Lipps, and Wooden
(2007) for details.
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Table 7: International Evidence: Other OECD Economiesy
Changes over time
1  1   ltotal lfemales
Netherlands (1983-2010) 1.22 1.13 1.20 1.66
Spain (1987-2010) 1.22 0.86 1.15 1.72
Finland (1995-2010) 1.19 1.11 1.08 1.10
Italy (1983-2010) 1.11 0.84 1.04 1.26
UK (1984-2010) 1.08 1.00 1.01 1.25
Belgium (1983-2010) 1.03 0.95 1.07 1.39
Austria (1995-2010) 1.01 1.00 1.02 1.03
Sweden (1995-2010) 1.00 1.03 1.01 1.02
France (1983-2010) 0.97 0.96 0.96 1.12
Australia (1979-2008) 0.93 1.00 0.96 1.11
yWe use OECD National Accounts and Labor Force Statistics to construct average usual hours worked for
all working-age persons, ltotal, and for females, lfemales, as well as the labor wedge, . We construct e¤ective
labor income taxes,  , using consumption and labor taxes provided by McDaniel (2007) for 1950-2010, see
Excel le available at http://www.caramcdaniel.com/researchpapers.
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